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The covid-19 pandemic has brought about new ways of conducting business 
through the use of Information Communication Technologies and elections have 
not been spared either. Internet voting is another form of strengthening democracy 
through the use of Information Communication Technologies. Africa lags in the 
implementation of electronic voting, especially Internet voting. This chapter applied 
a critical socio-technical analysis that analyses factors that influence the applicabil-
ity of Internet voting within the African context. The researcher applied desktop 
research which included 30 journals to gather data from the Internet and other docu-
mentation sources. The findings reveal that decision-makers can partially imple-
ment Internet voting in some of the countries in Africa like Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, 
Morocco, Mauritius, Tunisia, and Seychelles. To successfully implement Internet 
voting, the decision-makers in African nations have to fully invest in the Information 
Communication Technology infrastructure, provide the necessary security, legisla-
tion and carry out intensive voter education to build trust among voters.
Keywords: Covid-19, lockdown, pandemic, Internet voting, critical socio-technical 
analysis, democracy
1. Introduction
Democracy has formed the foundation of governance in the world, with every 
voter willing to express his/her views on the ballot [1, 2]. Elections have been held 
manually and electronically in both the developed and developing nations, some 
results have ended in contestations and wars erupting after the elections. Covid-19 
has had a devastating effect on the political, social, and economic spheres in the 
world [3]. The way of running elections was also affected by this pandemic as nations 
sought to find ways of halting the spread of the disease. In developed nations coun-
tries like Estonia and other American states have been implementing Internet voting.
Africa is constituted by 54 countries with diversified democracies [4]. Eritrea 
is the only country that does not hold regular elections as has continuously post-
poned elections citing security threat from its neighbors Ethiopia and Djibouti. 
The African nations have diversified electoral systems, with some countries like 
Zimbabwe implementing first past the post and proportional representation, 
and South Africa, the proportional representation in their polls [5]. Most of the 
African countries hold regular manual elections as demanded by the United Nations 
Universal Declarations on elections.
The prospects for the growth of democracy in the 21st century in Africa 
depend on how the continent positions itself for value-adding services such as 
Contemporary Issues in Information Systems - a Global Perspective
2
Internet voting. Covid −19 has forced the world to quickly develop and implement 
Information Communication Technologies (ICT) opportunities previously unimag-
inable. For Africa to take advantage of this, an effective enabling environment and 
use of ICTs is a particularly important contributor to modern democracy.
2. Literature review
Internet voting is where a ballot is cast by the voter through the Internet [6]. The 
use of Internet voting gained popularity in Estonia since 2001. Estonia is the first 
country to carry out a successful pilot project in municipal elections in 2005. Estonia 
went on further to first use Internet voting in the 2007 parliamentary elections [7].
The four kinds of Internet voting are kiosk Internet voting, polling-place Internet 
voting, precinct Internet voting, and remote Internet voting (Canada-Europe 
Transatlantic [8]). Kiosk Internet voting involves the use of a computer at a specific 
location (an authorized internet polling station) that is controlled by election officials. 
This differs from a standalone electronic voting machine because the ballot is imme-
diately transmitted over the Internet to the central vote-counting site. Polling-place 
Internet voting is conducted through the use of a computer at any polling station and 
is supervised by the usual election officials. Precinct Internet voting is very similar to 
polling-place voting except that it must occur at the voter’s designated precinct polling 
station (voters are only allowed to cast their ballots at polling stations where they are 
registered). Remote Internet voting is where a voter cast the ballot from the comfort of 
their homes or where the is Internet provision [9]. The advantages, disadvantages, and 
countries that are implementing Internet voting are shown in Table 1.
Internet Voting 
type






• Convenient and accessible 
for voters who have Internet 
access at home, at work, or 
abroad; and for persons with 
disabilities, the military, 
single parents, voters who are 
traveling, etc.
• Flexible voting time for 
voters
• Flagging of ballot errors
• Replication of ballot images 
without voter informa-
tion for counting or audit 
purposes
• Lower cost than traditional 
methods
• Potential to enhance 
electoral efficiency
• Faster and more accurate 
election results
• Elimination of long queues
• Instant absentee ballot
• Font size and screen 
language can be modified
• Limited access to the 
Internet or limited 
understanding on part of 
some voters
• Possibility of stolen voter 
packages or identification 
cards
• Misuse of voter’s Identity 
Card (ID) and personal 
information voting by oth-
ers without the knowledge 
of the voter
• Difficulty verifying voter ID
• Possible pressure on voters 
to vote a certain way if in 
the presence of others
• Hacks or viruses attacking 
the systems and altering 
election results
• Technical difficulties, 
programming errors, or 
server malfunctions
• Inaccuracies of the voter’s 
list, resulting in one voter 

























• Placement inconvenient 
high traffic locations 
(for example, malls and 
supermarkets)
• Flexible voting time for 
voters
• Flagging of ballot errors
• Replication of ballot  
images without voter 
information for counting or 
audit purposes
• Potential to help address 
the voting needs of certain 
groups of voters (persons 
with disabilities, single 
parents, etc)
• Potential to enhance 
electoral efficiency
• Faster and more accurate 
election results
• Elimination of long queues
• Lack of paper trail to  
allow auditing and  
recounts
• In the case of a power 
outage, no alternate  
method is available
• Cost of machines
• Software may sometimes be 
unreliable
• Voters may leave the  
voting screen before the 
ballot is officially cast
• Hacks or viruses  
attacking the system  
and altering results
• Voters may be pressured  
to vote a certain way if  
in the presence of  
others
• Technical difficulties, 
programming errors, server 
malfunctions
• Machine updating  
and cost
• Candidate representative’s 
oversight function  
may be diminished
• Inaccuracies on the  
voters’ list could result in 
one voter receiving a card 







• Eliminates mismarked or 
spoiled ballots and other 
invalid results
• Programmable machines 
to dispense ballots for any 
election
• Removal of authentication 
questions so voter  
identification is most 
similar to the traditional 
process
• Assistive devices to improve 
accessibility for voters with 
disabilities
• Faster and accurate election 
results
• Font size and screen 
language can be  
modified
• Auditing and recounts  
can be questioned if there is 
no paper trail
• In the case of a machine 
failure (that is, power  
outage) no alternate 
method is available
• Cost of machines
• Software may sometimes  
be unreliable (many 
machines have a negative 
reputation based on failure 
in USA trials)
• Voters may leave the  
voting screen before  
the ballot is officially  
cast
• Little advantage for  
voters in terms of 
convenience
• Machine updating  

















United States of 
America
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As shown in Table 1, Internet voting is necessitated by the demographics 
of a country especially people living abroad who would want to exercise their 
democratic right but will not be residing within the citizenry country during an 
election. Chisinau [11] argues that Internet voting will allow voters to cast their 
ballots at the comfort of their homes or convenient places. Voting through the 
Internet is easier as voters can cast ballots using their own devices and there is 
no time wasted in long queues. Voters do not travel long distances, thus reducing 
transportation costs and can do other business chores. It allows for inclusiv-
ity as people living with disabilities or serious medical conditions can exercise 
their democratic rights. Internet voting will also allow those people who will be 










• Elimination of mismarked 
or spoiled ballots and other 
invalid results
• Programmable machines 
to dispense ballots for any 
election
• Assistive devices to improve 
accessibility for voters with 
disabilities
• Removal of authentication 
questions so that voter 
identification is most similar 
to the traditional process
• Faster and accurate election 
results
• Font and screen language 
can be modified
• Auditing and recounts can 
be questioned if there is no 
paper trail
• In the case of machine fail-
ure (that is power outage), 
no alternate is available
• Machines are expensive
• The software can sometimes 
be unreliable
• A voter may leave a voting 
screen before the ballot has 
been officially cast
• Little additional conve-
nience for voters









• Convenience and accessibility 
for voters who have telephones 
or mobile gadgets; and for cer-
tain groups of voters (persons 
with disabilities, military, 
single parents, travelers, etc.
• Flexible voting time for voters
• Flagging of ballot errors
• Familiar technology, espe-
cially for those familiar with 
telephone banking
• No ballot printing
• Fewer elections staff and poll 
locations
• Less costly
• Potential increase in voter 
turnout
• Enhanced electoral efficiency
• Elimination of long queues
• No paper trail makes tradi-
tional recount impossible
• Possibility of stolen voter 
packages or identification 
cards
• Difficulty verifying voter ID
• Must ensure candidate repre-
sentative’s function is written 
into the program (e.g. Halifax 
candidate module)
• Others present may pressure 
voters to vote a certain way
• Possible telephone/mobile 
lines overloading or phone 
service interruption
• Inaccuracies on the voter’ 
list could result in one voter 






Comparison of internet voting methods.
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The disadvantage of Internet voting is that it consists of a large complex network 
which makes it difficult to monitor the entire network, thus posing a serious secu-
rity threat. The monitoring of the network is very expensive of which there is no 
100 percent guarantee that the network will be secure. Hackers could use malware 
to rig the outcome of the elections, by tampering with the way votes are submitted 
and counted or even casting votes for people who did not vote. Internet voting may 
be a source of conflict between political parties if one party considers that Internet 
voting might be beneficial to the other party/parties [12].
2.1 Critical socio-technical analysis
The critical socio-technical analysis [10] which is premised on analyzing an 
information system during the systems development life cycle was used to identify key 
factors in the applicability of Internet voting in Africa. By finding key factors affecting 
the applicability of Internet voting in Africa, it is expected that decision-makers would 
come up with strategies that support the successful implementation of such systems.
African Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) have been using manual systems 
in general elections for the past decades which has resulted in disputed elections, high 
operating costs affecting the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) because of systems and 
processes inefficiency. Only two countries, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Namibia have used polling stationed-based electronic voting machines which do not 
have Internet connectivity [13]. Covid-19 has not helped the situation either as countries 
have been forced into lockdowns, compelling nations to postpone elections. The intro-
duction of Internet voting especially casting a ballot outside a polling station is the most 
difficult technological upgrade for an Electoral Management Body (EMB) as it involves 
the core of the entire electoral process [14]. This chapter investigated ‘why’ and ‘what’ 
factors were affecting the applicability of Internet voting in African general elections.
3. Methodology
In this study, desktop research was used to collect data from 30 journals and 
other documentation about factors affecting the applicability of Internet voting 
in Africa. The critical socio-technical analysis was then used to guide this study in 
the search and analysis of factors such as political, social, technical, legal, security, 
privacy, trust, and transparency affecting the applicability of Internet voting in 
Africa. These factors were selected after critically analyzing contemporary issues 
in developing and developed countries successfully implementing, on trials or have 
abandoned the implementation of Internet voting.
4. Findings
While the benefits from Internet voting will guarantee the rights of citizens to 
exercise their democratic rights, the study discovered that no country in Africa is 
implementing Internet voting in general elections. The factors affecting the appli-
cability of Internet voting in Africa are political, legal, social, technical, security, 
privacy, transparency, and trust.
4.1 Political
Africa has the most number of people that flee their countries seeking greater 
opportunities from developing and developed nations [15]. Citizens from African 
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countries migrate to other countries due to the effects of climatic changes, such as 
droughts, storms, and flooding. Other factors such as economic and political stability 
(wars) also force nationals to migrate to other countries seeking better opportunities 
[16]. The migration of people allows African countries to offer their citizens their 
democratic rights by allowing them to vote through the Internet. Some African gov-
ernments also tend Internet shutdowns citing national security or curbing the spread 
of fake news during elections, for example, the Ugandan, Libya, Malawi, and Sudan 
Presidential elections [17] which makes it difficult to implement Internet voting.
4.1.1 Legal
The legal framework allows voters to exercise their rights during an election or 
absentee voting through the Internet [18]. For African citizens living abroad or who 
will be committed during election day to exercise their democratic right, there must 
be legislation that supports Internet voting. The legal framework empowers the EMB 
and other stakeholders to remove the element of mistrust, as the voting process is done 
within the confines of the law. At the moment no country in Africa is exploring the use 
of Internet voting rendering the introduction of such legislation a futile exercise.
4.1.2 Technical
African countries are still facing challenges in the implementation of mobile com-
munication and Internet technologies [19]. Countries like Somalia, South Sudan, and 
Mozambique have often been affected by ravaging wars, which destroys infrastruc-
ture and forcing these countries into retarded economic growth. As shown in Table 1, 
the limitation in the Internet penetration factor is that the network service providers 
do not provide 100% service coverage. This makes it practically impossible to offer 
Internet voting within the country for national general elections as some other com-
munities will be disadvantaged by failing to access the service to cast their ballots. 
The penetration of internet communication in Africa is very low at 43% as shown 
in Table 2. Countries like Kenya, Libya, Mauritius, Nigeria, Morocco, Seychelles, 
and Tunisia have a higher national Internet penetration factor. These countries can 
partially implement Internet voting in some of their regions. Other African nations 
especially that are below 50% like Eretria, Togo, Western Sahara, South Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, and Somalia will have difficulties in implementing Internet voting nationally.
4.1.3 Social
There is a wide gap between the digital divide within the African nations especially 
between the urban and the rural community, the elderly, and the young generations 
[20]. The young generations have embraced technology as they use smartphones and 
laptops as communication and business tools. A large population in African countries 
live in rural communities. Some of these people cannot afford to buy gadgets, power, 
and data used for Internet services. There is also a lack of digital skills and literacy 
among the communities both in urban and rural setups especially among the elderly. 
The content or language used on the Internet makes it difficult for some African 
communities to comprehend the importance of using such services. Hence the use of 
Internet voting in African countries will be difficult because of the digital divide.
4.1.4 Security
Internet voting should be secure for the results to be credible [21]. Key factors 
such as freedom, and equality during an election are important aspects of security 
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Algeria 44,616,624 24,474,161 27,992,084 25,428,159 57.0%
Angola 33,933,610 4,992,399 5,967,849 8,980,670 26.5%
Benin 12,451,040 4,802,303 5,378,554 3,801,758 30.5%
Botswana 2,397,241 924,709 1,444,142 1,139,000 47.5%
Burkina Faso 21, 497,096 2,395,226 2,497,500 4,594,625 21.4%
Burundi 12,255,433 5,113,418 5,863,257 1,606,122 13.1%
Cabo Verde 561,898 392,731 N/A 352,120 62.7%
Cameroon 27,224,265 6,900,928 13,001,295 7,878,422 28.9%
Central 
African Rep.
4,919,981 1,954,433 2,005,942 557,085 11.3%
Chad 16,914,985 6,252,548 5,809,346 2,237,932 13.2%
Comoros 888,451 313,647 474,387 193,700 21.8%
Congo 5,657,013 2,221,596 2,617,983 833,200 14.7%
Congo Dem. 
Rep.
92,377,993 40,371,439 44,138,661 16,355,917 17.7%
Cote d’lvoire 27,053,629 7,359,399 15,503,401 12,253,653 45.3%
Djiboti 1,002,187 215,687 609,344 548,832 54.8%
Egypt 104,258,327 63,157,351 63,705,978 54,741,493 52.5%
Equatorial 
Guinea
1,449,896 325,555 417,365 362,891 25.0%
Eritrea 3,601,467 N/A N/A 248,199 6.9%
Eswatini 1,172,362 546,784 N/A 665,245 56.7%
Ethiopia 117,876,227 36,851,461 49,011,364 21,147,255 17.9%
Gabon 2,278,825 680,194 1,177,350 1,367,641 60.0%
Gambia 2,486,945 886,578 1,151,645 442,050 19.0%
Ghana 31,732,129 17,027,641 N/A 14,767,818 46.5%
Guinea 13,497,244 5,410,089 6,556,813 2,551,672 18.9%
Guinea-Bissau 2,015,494 645,085 935,920 250,000 12.4%
Kenya 54,985,698 15,590,236 25,374,082 46,870,422 85.2%
Lesotho 2,159,079 1,254,506 N/A 682,990 31.6%
Liberia 5,180,203 2,183,629 2,319,382 760,994 14.7%
Libya 6,958,532 1,509,218 4,029,365 5,857,000 84.2%
Madagascar 28,427,328 10,302,194 14,291,036 2,864,000 10.1%
Malawi 19,647,684 6,859,570 10,030,988 2,717,243 13.8%
Mali 20,855,735 7,663,464 8,920,714 12,480,176 59.8%
Mauritania 4,775,119 1,417,823 2,125,242 969,519 20.3%
Mauritius 1,273,433 941,719 1,044,325 919,000 72.2%
Mayotee (FR) 279,515 N/A N/A 107,940 38.6%
Morocco 37,344,795 15,702,592 23,126,996 25,589,581 68.5%
Mozambique 32,163,047 13,153,088 13,554,684 6,523,613 20.3%
Namibia 2,587,344 1,358,468 1,479,603 1,347,418 52.11%
Niger 25,130,817 7,446,556 9,623,301 3,363,848 13.4%
Nigeria 211,400,708 82,344,107 106,490,312 154,301,195 73.0%
Reunion (FR) 901,686 110,968 N/A 608,000 67.4%
Rwanda 13,276,513 7,172,612 N/A 5,981,638 45.1%
Saint Helena 
(UK)
6,086 2,309 N/A 2,300 37.8%
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requirements for Internet voting. The transmission of all voting data to servers or 
tabulation centers must be secure. All voting which is done whether on the Internet or 
otherwise should be granted the same status as any other vote cast in the same elec-
tion. This means that each vote should be given the same weight as it also determines 
the outcome of an election [22]. Various encryption methods have been suggested for 
use with Internet voting including the blockchain [23]. African countries should have 
networks that can encrypt ballots cast over the Internet without the network being 
compromised, overloaded, or due to other disruptions like shutdowns.
4.1.5 Privacy
With the use of Internet voting, an EMB has to ensure that each vote cast remains 
a secret. A free election means that the voter must not be coerced by public or private 
pressure. After voting through the Internet, the voters should have an acknowledg-
ment for the candidate that they have voted for. All ballots cast through the Internet 
should be accorded the same secrecy as in manual systems [24]. If a ballot is cast, the 
voter’s identification details must be able to be authenticated and not linked to the 
ballot. The vote cast should also be accounted for in the outcome without identifying 
the voter. In Africa voter intimidation remains a serious challenge [25], thus through 
Internet voting, voters may be coerced to vote for undeserving candidates.
4.1.6 Trust and transparency
Trust in Internet voting can only be accepted if the results from this service are 















Sao Tome & 
Princepe
223,368 97,274 105,318 63,684 28.6%
Senegal 17,196,301 6,683,043 8,071,074 9,749,527 56.7%
Seychelles 98,908 74,634 N/A 71,300 72.1%
Sierra Leone 8,141,343 3,178,663 3,284,182 1,043,725 12.8%
Somalia 16,359,504 4,220,466 N/A 2,089,900 12.8%
South Africa 60,041,994 25,809,443 37,372,792 34,545,165 57.5%
South Sudan 11,381,378 4,800,000 N/A 900,716 7.9%
Sudan 44,909,353 13,126,989 19,667,400 13,124,100 29.2%
Tanzania 61,498,437 29,754,699 29,480,237 23,142,960 37.6%
Togo 8,478,437 3,738,786 4,645,140 1,011,837 11.9%
Tunisia 11,935,766 7,065,885 8,219,612 8,170,000 68.4%
Uganda 47,123,531 8,219,612 8,219,612 18,502,166 39.3%
Western 
Sahara
611,875 N/A N/A 28,000 4.6%
Zambia 18,920,651 6,698,372 7,331,669 9,870,427 52.2%
Zimbabwe 15,092,171 5,695,706 7,650,931 8,400,000 55.7%
Total Africa 1,373,486,514 590,296,163 43.0%
Rest of world 6,502,279,070 N/A N/A 4,463,594,959 68.6%
World Total 7,875,765,584 5,053,891,122 64.2%
Source:https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm, https://www.idea.int/data-tools/continent-view/Africa/40
Table 2. 
Internet users statistics for Africa.
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build trust voters should also be able to verify that all collected ballots were from 
eligible voters and that they have been accurately counted [26]. If Internet voting is 
to be implemented in African countries pilot testing has to be undertaken to allow 
voters to test the system before being fully implemented in a general election. To 
build trust among stakeholders (voters, activists, and media) an EMB should be 
transparent in all the activities involved with Internet voting. To avoid mistrust 
from the public, the stakeholders should be educated on how Internet voting works 
and also made to appreciate the qualities of the system. Relevant information should 
be availed in a language that can easily be understood by the public. The informa-
tion should include full technical documentation of how the system is designed 
functionally and technically, all levels of software documentation, source code, and 
the technical and organizational environments where the system is hosted.
4.2 Discussion and analysis
With the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic causing deaths, and unavoidable 
shutdowns, elections cannot be suspended indefinitely, decision-makers have to 
find alternative ways of conducting elections without compromising the health 
and safety of the electorate. Internet voting is one such method that may guarantee 
the health and safety of the electorate where voters can vote in the comfort of their 
homes. Decision-makers have to take note of the following during feasibility studies 
and implementation of Internet voting:
Politically, it is fundamental to foster a broad consensus among political parties 
for the implementation of Internet voting. This involves transparency where the 
relevant actors have a voice. Internet voting should be seen as politically neutral 
that is the new procedure should not benefit disproportionally given factions of the 
political spectrum [27]. For electoral results to be accepted by voters, Internet vot-
ing must produce an outcome that reflects the will of the people in an environment 
that establishes transparency and trust [14].
Technological and security concerns are often pointed to as the main concern of 
Internet voting [28]. To validate and verify the technological voting system the set 
of technological requirements have to be consulted systematically. In Africa, some 
voters live in remote areas but may also want to cast their ballots using the Internet. 
African countries have limited Internet infrastructure which should prompt 
governments to improve this area if its citizens are to benefit from Internet voting. 
The improvement on the infrastructure would also benefit an EMB during the voter 
registration process, as voters will be able to register through the Internet.
There have been numerous attacks of electronic voting systems over the Internet 
with the 2016 American Presidential election being the most contentious election 
of the decade [29]. The stakes of any general election are always high, which may 
create interests chief among them malicious actors-particularly in countries with 
specific geopolitical adversaries who may specifically create and deploy attacks 
or malware designed to manipulate the vote. In Africa, the use of Internet voting 
which has got limited transparency and audit trail may lead to manipulation and 
voter fraud. It will be very difficult to monitor votes cast over the Internet, to build 
trust among the citizens an EMB has to be trusted in pursuing its mandate.
Most electronic voting systems are now being developed with blockchain encryption 
[30, 31]. Blockchain technology is an end-to-end encryption method that secures ballots 
transmitted from voters’ private devices to a centralized tabulation facility. However, it 
has been observed that most serious vulnerabilities threatening integrity and secrecy 
of voting happen before ballots ever reach the blockchain. Voters may be coerced by 
family members or other pressure groups to vote in a certain way that does not reflect 
their will. It is also difficult to validate if the voter is the real one casting the ballot which 
Contemporary Issues in Information Systems - a Global Perspective
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Internet voting 
used in General 
Elections
Partial use of Internet voting and 
Special cases
Planned to be piloted or Piloted but 
Discontinued or Never Used
Estonia is the 
only country to 
allow citizens 
the option of 




Armenia: Diplomatic staff and their 
families can vote online.
France: Voting was never used for out-of-
country voters in the 2012 parliamentary 
elections but discontinued in 2017 due to 
security concerns; the government plans to 
bring it back in 2022.
Out-of-country residents also voted online 
in the 2016 Republican party primaries.
Australia: Online voting was trialed 
for out-of-country military personnel 
in 2017 but has been discontinued. New 
South Wales allows some groups- voters 
with disabilities, living in remote areas, 
out of state- to vote online, but there are 
no plans to extend this option to other 
states.
India: In 2010. Internet voting was trialed 
in the local elections in the state of Gujarat.
Canada: Online voting is possible for 
municipal elections in some districts of 
Ontario and Nova Scotia. Canada has 
considered introducing Internet voting in 
federal elections.
Norway: Online voting for2011 local and 
2013 national elections was made available 
in some districts. In 2014, Internet voting 
was discontinued for security reasons.
Mexico: Some states have allowed online 
voting for out-of-sorts country voters.
In 2004, the Netherlands used Internet 
voting for an election to the Rijnland water 
board and in 2006 for out-of-country 
voters for national elections. Internet 
voting was discontinued in 2017 due to 
security concerns.
New Zealand: Out-of-country voters can 
vote online.
Spain: In 2010, Barcelona held an online 
referendum on an urban development 
project. The voting was a one-off, online-
only pilot and was highly controversial.
Panama: Out-of-country voters can vote 
online.
United Kingdom: Online voting was 
trialed in local council elections between 
2002 and 2007.
Switzerland: Some cantons offer online 
voting to out-of-country voters- also in a 
few cases, to resident voters- in elections 
and referendums. The stated goal is to 
roll out Internet voting to the entire 
country.
Russia: is set to introduce its first online 
voting system. The system will be tested in 
a Moscow neighborhood that will elect a 
single member to the capital’s city council 
in September 2019.
One of the first experiments to introduce 
Internet voting was conducted by the 
Electoral Commission of the Volgograd 
Region during voting in Uryupinsk in 
2009, and the Odintsovo district in 2010.
United States: Despite the security 
concerns raised after a District of 
Columbia trial of Internet voting was 
hacked, more than 30 U.S. states allow 
military personnel and out-of-country 
residents to vote online. Voters using 
online or mail ballots waive their secrecy 
rights.
Finland has appointed a working group to 
study the technical feasibility of an online 
voting system. It determined that the 
technology does not yet sufficiently meet 
all the requirements, citing problems with 




Countries that use internet voting (use of internet voting outside of polling stations in politically binding elections).
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is crucial to the credibility of an election. Estonia, for instance, has resolved this issue 
without blockchain by using e-ID cards. Blockchain technology also does not protect 
against -denial-of-service attacks that make servers unable to operate, does not protect 
information as it travels on the Internet, and does not make servers and infrastructure 
more resistant to advanced persistent threats. Despite improvements in encryption 
techniques, security will always remain a challenge for Internet voting.
The major social challenge is the digital divide as some parts of the population 
remain excluded from Internet voting and that gap exists in African countries 
regarding computer literacy and household Internet usage and availability. The 
‘Digital transformation Strategy’ adopted by African countries in February 2020 
should be pursued to narrow the gap between the digital divide in urban and rural 
communities and also narrow the ‘gender digital divide’ [32].
Currently, most African countries do not have any legislation that supports 
Internet voting. The legal framework should be put in place to allow for Internet vot-
ing, which should clearly state who is eligible and the reasons that support eligibility.
Despite low usage in Internet voting around the world, Estonia is the only coun-
try that has fully utilized this service in general elections. Table 3 highlights coun-
tries that have fully, partially, piloting and discontinued the use of Internet voting.
The success of Internet voting depends largely on how it is perceived by the people 
meant to use it: citizens. For example, Internet voting is difficult to be transparent as 
compared to manual systems. The transparency and reliability of Internet voting have 
been questioned, as this is electronically done. Therefore, it is fundamental to know 
what their attitudes towards the implementation of Internet voting would affect them.
5. Conclusions
The applicability of Internet voting in Africa largely depends on how the nation’s 
willingness to adapt to new technology in the face of challenges such as political, 
legal, security, privacy, trust and transparency, the digital divide, and limited 
infrastructure. The successful experience of countries such as Estonia highlights the 
importance of a gradual, step-by-step design and implementation of Internet voting 
which may be used for benchmarking. It is also recommended that the perception of 
the citizens should be taken into consideration. African nations should also make an 
effort to improve the internal coverage of Internet services within their territories.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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